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Abstract
This paper achieves four objectives relating to the design of efficient
mechanisms in economies with asymmetric information. First, we show that
it is impossible to design an individually rational and efficient mechanism
using Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. Under complete
information, however, such mechanisms can be designed. Second, we attempt
to bridge this gap between complete information economies and an important
sub-class of asymmetric information economies by exploring the
possibilities with "mechanisms with no regret" that leak information. A
complete characterization is given of "No regret-implementation" using such
mechanisms. These mechanisms are played in four stages including a "regret
phase" and yield a refinement of Green and Laffont's (1987) posterior
implementability concept. Third, it is shown that though such mechanisms
cannot implement interim individually rational and efficient performance
standards, they can implement ex post individually rational and efficient
standards. Finally, it is shown that even under asymmetric information
such mechanisms implement any Nash implementable performance standard, such
as the core or the Walrasian correspondence.
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1. Introduction
In economies with asymmetric information, a performance standard is a
non-empty set of socially "desirable" state-contingent allocations. Given
the incompleteness of information about the realized state of the world, a
mechanism is required to implement a given performance standard. An
implementing mechanism is a game of incomplete information with a non-empty
set of equilibrium outcomes that is contained within the standard. {Full
implementation requires coincidence of the two sets.) Most economies
aspire towards the two basic objectives of individual rationality and
efficiency. This paper reports a fundamental difficulty with any attempt to
design mechanisms for implementing individually rational-efficient
performance standards, and then proposes conditions under which there
exists a solution to this crucial problem. In light of the difficulties
that were just alluded to, this is the only result that demonstrates the
possibility of designing individually rational-efficient mechanisms in a
wide class of asymmetric information economies. Moreover, we show that
despite the information asymmetry it is possible to implement any standard
that is Nash-implementable (i.e. with complete information), such as the
core or the Walrasian correspondence.
By the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979), Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin (1979), Harris and Townsend (1981), etc.), any performance standard
that has a non-empty intersection with the set of Bayesian equilibrium
outcomes of a game must satisfy an incentive comaptibility (or
self-selection) condition. We know of no satisfactory performance standard
that meets this condition. Thus, if we are interested in questions of
mechanism design in a wide class of environments, the conclusions are
negative right away.
To surmount this initial hurdle, Palfrey and Srivastava (1987a) invoke
Postlewaite and Schmeidler's (1986) restriction on the informational
structure — non-exclusivity of information (NEI) — and then ask whether
performance standards that were fully implementable under complete
information can be fully implemented when information is asymmetric. The
NEI restriction essentially requires that if all agents except one pool
their private information they can deduce the information of the remaining
agent. It ensures incentive compatibility but is clearly restrictive.
Unfortunately, some restriction of this nature is necessary to evaluate the
implementability of natural economic performance standards. The striking
message of Palfrey and Srivastava is: despite the restriction and despite
the fact that incentive compatibility is satisfied, full Bayesian
implementation of either the interim or the ex post efficiency standard (as
defined in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)) is impossible. This is in sharp
contrast to the positive results obtained under complete information.
Palfrey and Srivastava's (1987a) negative results provide the starting
point for this paper. We extend their arguments and show that the
situation is even more grim than is implied by their results. Define an
efficient Bayesian mechanism as a game such that all of its Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes are efficient (in either an interim or ex post sense).
However disappointing the Palfrey and Srivastava conclusions may be, they
do not imply that we can never hope to design an efficient mechanism since
there still exists the possibility of Bayesian-implementing (as opposed to
fully Bayesian-implementing) the efficiency standard or one of its subsets.
The first part of this paper argues that, indeed, even under NEI, we
cannot hope to find an efficient Bayesian mechanism if we impose an
additional restriction of individual rationality on the standard. The
latter rules out uninteresting outcomes that assign all resources to one
individual. Such outcomes are efficient and trivially implementable. To
summarize, both the interim and the ex post individual
rationality-efficiency standard (and their respective subsets) are
non-implementable in Bayesian equilibria. An additional implication of
this part of the paper is: when one is interested in checking for
impossibility results, "implementation" (as opposed to "full
implementation") is the notion that one should focus on; a standard that is
not fully implementable may be implementable whereas one that is not
implementable can never be fully implementable.
These impossibility results indicate the cost, in terms of social
welfare, that is imposed on society by the presence of information
asymmetry. Under complete information, the literature on
Nash-implementation, (Maskin (1977), Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite
(1984), etc.) has shown that individually rational-efficient mechanisms do
indeed exist. Can this gap be filled by a mechanism that not only
allocates resources but also "leaks" information?
The next step in the agenda is to tackle the problem of non-existence
of individually rational-efficient Bayesian mechanisms by addressing the
question posed in the previous paragraph. We take advantage of the fact
that the mechanism designer has the flexibility to not only choose the game
but also how it is played. Following the lead of Green and Laffont (1987),
we study the case of mechanisms with a "regret" phase. Green and Laffont
do not provide any specific structure to the changes in the rules of the
game. In this paper, we adopt a particular sequence of moves that allows
for a regret phase in a simultaneous-move game. This sequence is a slight
modification of the structure that is implicit in Green and Laffont's
model. The resulting equilibrium that we obtain is a refinement of Bayesian
equilibria and of posterior implementable equilibria (due to Green and
Laffont).
The structure that we employ evolves in four stages and is informally
described with the help of an example in the following paragraphs.
Example 1: Consider a game with two players and three states of the
world: "Rain", "Shine" and "Clouds". Player 1 chooses T or B and is
completely uninformed. Her prior beliefs are that there is an equal chance
of any one of the states occurring. Player 2 chooses L, M or R and is
completely informed. Their payoffs are given in Figure 1. This is the
original game. The pure strategy Bayesian equilibria of the original game
are given in Figure 2. A game designer can introduce a regret phase in
rules of play of this game.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.]
The game with a regret phase is played in four stages. In the first
stage, the players and the game designer calculate the set of Bayesian
equilibria in the original game. This constitutes the maximal set of
possible outcomes. Next, Nature selects a state of the world. In the
second stage, the players submit to the designer the actions they intend to
take in every equilibrium. These submissions are not commitments and are
made public knowledge by the designer. In the third stage, the agents are
given the opportunity to entertain the desire to unilaterally deviate from
one or more of the Bayesian equilibria. In the final stage, (as is usually
assumed in game theory) by some unbiased method a particular Bayesian
equilibrium, say s, is selected from the set comprising equilibria from
which no player wants to unilaterally deviate. s becomes common knowledge
among the players and the designer. The game designer distributes the
outcome/payoffs to the players by checking the actions that each player had
submitted for s and using the payoff matrices in Figure 1.
It can be observed that this structure is different from the one that
underlies Green and Laffont's notion of posterior implementable equilibria.
In their case, the unbiased selection of the equilibrium is done before the
second stage. Thus, they would require that in the second stage the
players submit the actions that they intend to take in the particular
equilibrium that is chosen.
To return to the example, a Bayesian equilibrium will survive the
third stage if and only if the information conveyed by the second stage
public submissions is such that neither player has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate in stage three from the action he/she had submitted
for that equilibrium in the previous stage. Such an equilibrium is
referred to as a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret.
Since equilibria are pairs of strategies that are common knowledge
functions, Player 1 could conceivably acquire some information if Player
2's action were associated with a unique state in some Bayesian
equilibrium. However, not all Bayesian equilibria convey information in
this manner.
Let the set of Bayesian equilibria with no regret be denoted E(D.
Every Bayesian equilibrium with no regret must be immune to information
revealed by any other Bayesian equilibrium with no regret. This follows
from the fact that in stage four a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret will
be chosen to determine the final outcome. Given that in stage two the
players do not know which one will be chosen, they will not have an
incentive to unilaterally make arbitrary submissions for any equilibrium in
E(D. This rules out unilateral manipulation on the part of the players by
the submission of messages that could mislead others. An equilibrium that
is not in E(D does not convey information since the players may submit
messages corresponding to such an equilibrium to mislead others about the
state of the world knowing that such equilibria shall never be used to
determine the final outcome.
The calculation of the set of Bayesian equilibria with no regret may
appear somewhat circular. We shall show how it is determined for the
example at hand.
*
Observe that the functions s', s" and s carry information if the
state is "Clouds". The equilibria s' and s remain self-enforcing even if
the information were revealed to Player 1 in the "Clouds" state by s', s"
* *
or s . This gives us a sufficiency condition: s' and s are Bayesian
equilibria with no regret. Are there any others? A necessary condition is
that a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret must not be destroyed by
information conveyed by another Bayesian equilibrium with no regret. It
can be checked that in s and s" Player 1 has an incentive to deviate in the
"Clouds" state given the information conveyed by s' and s . Thus, s' and
s constitute the set of Bayesian equilibria with no regret, E(D.
We conclude this example with two observations. First, note that the
*
Bayesian equilibria with no regret (e.g. s ) are not necessarily complete
information Nash equilibria of the game. Second, if we had employed Green
*
and Laffont's criterion, s, s' and s would have survived and s" would have
been eliminated. In sum, our criterion of regret requires greater
robustness from an equilibrium. While this is a strength from the
viewpoint of stability, it makes it more difficult to guarantee existence
of such equilibria. In this paper, we shall, however, prove the existence
of the set of Bayesian equilibria with no regret for any mechanism that we
use for our implementation result.
The positive results in the paper make use of mechanisms with a regret
phase as outlined in the example above. A complete characterization is
provided for performance standards that are No-regret-(NR)-implementable
(i.e. we use Bayesian equilibrium with no regret as the appropriate
equilibrium concept). The characterization results are used to prove the
following arguments. The interim individual rationality-efficiency
standard cannot be NR-implemented. However, the ex post individual
rationality-efficiency standard is NR-implementable. In general, any
standard that is Nash-implementable under complete information is also
NR-implementable under asymmetric information. The sub-class of
environments in which we demonstrate these results satisfy the NEI
condition. Thus, we are successful in bridging the gap (in terms of
efficient mechanism design) between NEI environments and complete
information environments.
As mentioned earlier, NEI is clearly restrictive. However, given the
constraints imposed by the Revelation Principle, some condition "close" to
NEI is also necessary to obtain any positive result (Blume and Easley
(1987) prove the necessity of NEI for implementability of the Rational
Expectations Equilibrium standard). Moreover, NEI is satisfied in a large
variety of environments involving informational asymmetry. A few of these
are listed below:
(i) In large enough economies the private information of any single
individual can be fairly accurately predicted by pooling the information
observed by the rest of the population.
(ii) Individuals can be one of several "types". The proportions of
each type in the population is known.
(iii) Information may depend on physical possession of some commodity
whose different varieties and total quantity is known. Each individual's
private holding is not common knowledge.
(iv) There are at least two fully informed individuals in the economy,
e.g. in certain markets with several sellers and buyers, all sellers are
presumed to be informed and all buyers are uninformed.
(v) Each individual has at least one other person who can verify
his/her information, e.g. close relatives, witnesses, etc.
(vi) Information is held by coalitions of individuals with the minimum
size of each coalition being two, e.g. family units with common preferences
over goods, preferences are determined by the school one attends,
collaborators who know each other's information, etc.
In sum, given that most individuals exist within certain social
institutions, truly exclusive relevant information may indeed be a rarity.
The success of real-world information collection mechanisms such as courts,
inquiry commissions, etc., which rely on gathering enough individuals to be
able to deduce the private information held by one individual, indicates
that NEI environments constitute a significant class. Thus, for a vast
number of realistic applications, a positive result that relies on the NEI
condition represents a significant improvement over impossibility results
or positive results under complete information.
Juxtaposed with related literature, our findings have several
interesting implications: (i) Green and Laffont's (1987) conclusions
regarding the application of games with a regret phase to the problem of
mechanism design were largely negative. We employ a stronger definition of
implementability and equilibrium and show that such games do, indeed, have
important applications towards deriving positive results. (ii) The most
widely studied concept of implementation is Nash-implementation whose
origins lie in the classic work of Maskin (1977). Maskin's
characterization of Nash-implementable standards (also see Saijo (1988))
has been criticized on the grounds that it applies only to complete
information settings. Our results show that the class of standards that
Maskin had identified as being implementable can be implemented (by
mechanisms with no regret) even when information is asymmetric. (iv)
Finally, we find that appropriate refinements of Bayesian equilibria
broadens the scope mechanism design — a fact discovered by Palfrey and
Srivastava (1987b) for economies with private values and by Moore and
Repullo (1988) for economies with complete information. Our results hold
for more general economies including those with common values. In
addition, the refinement is generated by changes made by the mechanism
designer and we do not rely on agents employing a specific refinement
criterion — observe that the Palfrey and Srivastava (1987b) mechanism is
based on elimination of dominated strategies and not successive elimination
of dominated strategies. The latter criterion would be more appealing from
a game-theoretic standpoint.
The following section presents the basic model that we shall use — an
exchange economy with privately informed agents. Section 3 introduces
Bayesian equilibria with no regret. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present results on
Bayesian-implementation and NR-implementation respectively and their
welfare inplications. The final section discusses possible extensions.
2. Preliminaries
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An asymmetric information economy, e, is a triple {L, N, 8}. L is a
set of goods, N is a set of agents and 6 is a set of states of the world.
All of these sets are non-empty and finite and the cardinalities of L and N
are given by I and n, respectively. & is the domain of all asymmetric
information economies. In the definitions that follow, we focus on a given
e e &. An explicit reference to e is dropped to minimize notational
burden.
Let e = {L, N, 9} be given. Every agent i e N is completely
* I
characterized by a list (u , w , IT , q ), where u : R x 6 -» R is agent i's
l 1 1 M I +
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; q (* 0) e R is agent i's
initial endowment of goods; IT is agent i's natural information partition
*
of 9 and q : 9 -> (0, 1) is agent i's prior probability distribution on 9.
Each constituent of this list is assumed to be given exogenously, and is
common knowledge in the sense of Aumann (1976). Let the function I : 8 ->
i
IT be defined by I°{6) = ie' € 9: there exists n € TT such that 6, Q' €
i i ii
it h The latter is agent i's natural information set in state B. By
"natural" information we refer to the information structure that the agent
is exogenously endowed with. This distinguishes it from the information
that can be acquired endogenously. In the sequel, let TT = x TT and Q =
Y u) . In addition, unless specified otherwise, x = [x ) and x =M€N 1 r 1 1€N -i
(xr)
J j€N\(l>
A = iz e R : Y z < Q} is the set of feasible allocations. A
+ ^1<=N 1 -
state-contingent allocation is a random variable /: 9 -» A. F is the domain
of such functions. A performance standard <p is a non-empty subset of F
such that for all 8 € 9 and all / € <p, /(8) * 0.. $ is the class of all
performance standards.
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Let P(X) denote the set of non-empty subsets of X. Agent i's
posterior probability distribution is the function q : x P(0) -> [0, 1]
defined by Bayes' Law, i.e. for all 9 e 6 and for all $ e P(8),
*
q (0) if € ?;
q (0. ? ) =
i
Ve» *, (8 '>
0, otherwise.
/Igent i's expected utility from f e F, given } e PCI (Q)) is £ q (8',
1
0'e?'
?)u (/ O'), 0'), and is written more compactly as EU (/ 9). Agent i's
^-expected lower contour set at f is given by EL (f 9) = {g € F: Et/ C/
9) > EU(g I m
The domain under consideration, S is defined as the collection of all
economies e ={L, N, Q} € g, that satisfy the following:
[Al] {strict monotonicity of preferences) Vi € N, V0 € 0, u (., .) is
t
strictly increasing in z 6 R , and
[A2] (non-exclusivity of information) Vi € N, V0 € 0, n I (0) =
' J€N\(1> j
<e>.
[A3] | J\T | > 2.
A mechanism is a game T = {JV, M, £}, where, given that M is agent i's
message (or action) space, M = x M ; and £: M -» i4 is an outcome function.
Agent i's strategy is a random variable s : Q ^ M such that s. is
IT -measurable. Let S be the domain of such functions. Let S = X S .11 1€N 1
3. Bayesian Equilibria with No Regret
The fundamental solution concept for games with asymmetric information
is that of Bayesian equilibrium due to Harsanyi (1967). This concept is
12
defined as follows:
s € S is a Bayesian equilibrium of T = {N, M, £,) if Vi e N, V0 e 0,
Vs'
€ S
,
i 1
£«(s\ s ) € EL (£os I I°(Q)).1-1 1 ' 1
Let £°(r) denote the set o/ Bayesian equilibria of r and £°(D = {£°s e F:
s € E (D, T = {N, M, £».
We shall use the following structure to formally specify the changes
in the rules of play introduced by a regret phase in a game. The
construction given below shall be used throughout the paper. Alternative
constructions are, of course, possible. The eventual objective of this
paper is to provide one method of construction that a mechanism designer
can employ.
An original game T played with a regret phase is denoted T .
Suppose T is such that E°(D * . Let K = {k : £°(D -> M defined^ ill
by: 39 € such that Vs € E°(D, s (0) = k (s)K Let I (0, s) = {0' €ill
J (0): s (0') = s (0)} be the information set revealed by s in 0.
l -l -I
T is played in four stages.
STAGE 1:
The agents and the mechanism designer compute E (D.
BETWEEN STAGES 1 AND 2:
Nature selects e 8.
STAGE 2:
Each agent i submits k € K to the designer. The designer makes
k public knowledge.
STAGE 3:
Each agent i is given the opportunity to entertain a desire to
deviate from any »c(s) for s e E°(D. Let the set of Bayesian equilibria
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that have not induced a desire for unilateral deviation by any i e N be
denoted £(D.
STAGE 4:
By some unbiased method, s € £(D is selected and is common
knowledge among the agents and the designer. The designer chooses the
outcome £(k(s)).
£(D is the set of Bayesian equilibria with no regret. Let E (D =
P
{£°s € F: s e £(r), r = iN, M, £}}. A game with a regret phase, T , for
which E(D * is a mechanism with no regret.
For the purposes of this paper, the following conditions shall
suffice for determining E(D. (A) is a sufficient condition for £(D *
and (B) is a necessary condition.
Condition (A): If 3s e E°(X; such that Vs' € E°(T;, Vi e JV, Vs" € S
,
1 i
^o(s , ' ( S ) e el^os | r ce, s';;,
then s € E(D.
Condition (B): If E(D * 0, then Vs, s' e E(D, Vi € A/, Vs" € S
,
€o(s", s ) € ELC^os I ire, s'U
l -i i ^ ' i
Condition (A) provides a method for determining at least one Bayesian
equilibrium with no regret. If there exists an equilibrium in E (D that
is immune to information revealed by all the Bayesian equilibria, it must
be a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret. Condition (B) provides an
internal consistency condition for the set E(D. Every Bayesian
equilibrium with no regret must be immune to information revealed by any
other Bayesian equilibrium with no regret. This follows from the fact that
in stage four a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret will be chosen to
determine the final outcome. Given that in stage two the agents do not
14
know which one will be chosen, they will not have an incentive to
unilaterally make arbitrary submissions for any equilibrium in £(D. This
rules out unilateral manipulation on the part of the agents by the
submission of messages that could mislead other agents. An equilibrium
that is not in £(D does not convey information since agents may submit
messages corresponding to such an equilibrium to mislead others about the
state of the world knowing that such equilibria shall never be used to
determine the final outcome.
4. Bayesian-Implementation and Welfare Implications
The classical approach to welfare economics has been to identify the
subset of allocations that are Pareto-efficient within the set of all
physically and technologically feasible allocations. Among these efficient
allocations, attention is generally focused on ones that are individually
rational. However, in asymmetric information economies, these welfare
evaluations must also take account of informational constraints — an
uninformed social planner cannot identify the set of individually
rational-efficient allocations in the absence of complete information about
the agents' preferences. The notion of an individually rational-efficient
allocation would vary depending on the extent of insurance that the
allocation provides each agent. Individual rationality and
Pareto-efficiency are thus extended to take account of different levels of
insurance and the appropriate notion depends on the timing of the welfare
analysis (see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) for a detailed discussion). The
two primary concepts of efficiency are:
15
Interim-efficiency: A state-contingent allocation / is
interim-efficient if there is no g e F such that Vi e N, V9 e 6, / € £L (g
i
| r°C8)) and / € int(EL (g | f°(9)) for some i e A/ and some 9 e 8.
Ex post-efficiency: A state-contingent allocation / is ex
post-efficient if there is no g € F such that Vi € N, V9 e 0, / e EL (g
i
'
{9}) and / e int(EL (g | {9}) for some i € N and some 9 e 8.
Given w e E defined by w(9) = u for all 9 € 8, let T l = (f e F: f is
interim efficient and Vi e N, V9 € 8, w € EL C/ | I°C9;;} and P
e h {/ <= F:
/ is ex post efficient and Vi 6 N, V9 € 8, w € EL C/ {9}} denote,
respectively, the sets of interim individually rational-efficient and ex
post individually rational-efficient performance standards.
Once a social planner decides on the appropriate notion of efficiency,
the question of implementing an efficient performance standard arises.
Once again, the informational asymmetry poses a constraint. A naive
mechanism in which each agent is asked to report his/her private
information to the planner will generally not ensure truth-telling as the
unique equilibrium strategy profile. Thus, we need to be guaranteed the
existence of a mechanism that implements the given standard. This is
defined (for the case where Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept)
as follows:
A performance standard <p is Bayesian-implementable by T in e = {L, N,
Q} if o * E°(D S <p.
F
r
A performance standard <p is Bayesian implementable (in a global sense)
if Ve
€ 8, 3T such that <p is Bayesian-implementable by T in e.
Remark: Full Bayesian-implementation of <p by V requires that E°(D = <p,
whereas weak Bayesian-implementation of (p by T requires that <p r\ E°(D * o.
Next, we present a condition that is necessary and, in economies in 8,
16
sufficient for a performance standard to be Bayesian-implementable. Before
we present the condition, some additional definitions are needed. We shall
use the approach of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and
Srivastava (1987) to define a "collection of compatible manipulation
operators".
A collection of compatible manipulation operators for TT (CCMO),
denoted a = (a ) , is defined by
i i€N
(i) Vi
€ N, a : n -» II
,
l l f
(ii) Vir
€
II, {fl ir * 0} » <H a Or ) * 0>.
1
' 1€N 1 " i€N 1 1
Let 8 : 8 -» 8 be the deception induced by a and defined by 6 (8) =
H a (I (0)). By assumption A2, 8 is a well-defined function.
A performance standard <p satisfies Property M if the following is
true:
3<p'€ * such that <p' £ <p and V/ € F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / e <p* and
(ii) vi e n, v g € f, ve € 8, ve' - e
a
(e), (g € EL(f | i°(e'))) =>
fgoea e ELff»e*
I
Ae)j;,
then /°8 € <p'.
Remark: <p satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if the Property M is modified as
follows: V/ e F, VCCMO's a, if (i)' and (ii)' imply /°8a e <p, where (i)' /
€ <p and (ii)' is the same as (ii) in the definition above.
Fact 1: There exists <p <= <t> such that <p satisfies Property M and violates
Bayesian monotonicity.
To check that this true, simply choose <p such that it is the union of
a Bayesian monotonic set <p' e * and a set <p" € $ which is not Bayesian
monotonic. For examples of such sets, see Palfrey and Srivastava (1987a).
Fact 2: Let e = {L, N, Q} be an economy in 8. A performance standard </> is
17
fully Bayesian-implementable by a game in e if and only if it satisfies
Bayesian monotonicity.
Proof: See Palfrey and Srivastava (1985).
The following proposition provides a parallel characterization of
Bayesian-implementability.
Proposition 1: Let e = {L, N, Q} be an economy in 8. A performance
standard <p is Bayesian-implementable by a game in e if and only if it
satisfies Property M.
Proof: (p is Bayesian-implementable if and only if there exists <p' e $ such
that <p' Q <p and <p' is fully Bayesian-implementable. Given Fact 2, the
proposition follows from the definitions.
In conjunction with the facts given above, the proposition has an
interesting implication: a performance standard may be
Bayesian-implementable even though it violates Bayesian monotonicity.
i e
Palfrey and Srivastava' s (1987a) examples suggest that the T and T
sets* are not fully Bayesian-implementable. However, disappointing as this
may be, we are interested in a more crucial question: can we ever hope to
design a mechanism so that all of its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are
individually rational-efficient (in either an interim or an ex post sense)?
In other words, is it possible to Bayesian-implement (i.e. to fully
Bayesian-implement some subset of) T or T in the domain of economies that
Palfrey and Srivastava have examined? It must be noted that their result
does not answer this latter question. The following results confirm that
the answer to the question is, indeed, negative.
The theorems are proved by way of counterexamples. We shall present
simple ones using linear economies. The negative results do not depend on
18
the assumption of linearity and hold for other utility specifications as
well.
Theorem 1: If <p Q T , then <p is not Bayesian-implementable.
Proof: Consider the following example:
Example 2: We define e = {L, N, 9> as follows. Let L = {X, Y) with the
quantities of the two goods being denoted by the corresponding lower case
letters. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let 9 = {a, b, c). IT = TT = {(a), (b),
1 2
(c)> and TT = IT = {(a), (b, c)>, i.e. agents 1 and 2 are fully informed
and agents 3 and 4 cannot distinguish between states b and c when one of
them occurs. An allocation z is written as (x
, y ) u> = ((0, 1), (0,
1 1 16N
1), (1, 0), (1, 0)). Each state is equally likely, i.e. q (a) = q (b) =
i i
*
1 I
q (c) = - for all i € N. u : \R x 8 -» IR is given as follows:
Vi
€ {1, 2), V9 € 9, a (z , 9) = x + l.ly
,
i
J
r
u (z . e) =
3 3
(
*3 + y3 ] '
if 9 = a
0.25U + y ) if 9 = b
3 3
0.75(x + y ) if 9 = c.
3 J 3
u
„
(z
„'
8) =
4 4
4 4
if G = a
0.75(x + y ) if 9 = b
4 4
0.25(x + y ) if 9 = c.
4 4
It can be checked that T * 0. Consider the following state-contingent
*
allocation, denoted / :
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z =
1
z =
2
z =
3
Z =
4
a b c
(0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (0. 1) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 0) (5,0)
(1, 0) (2, 0) (i 0)
3
*
f 6 p\ Also check that assumptions A1-A2 areIt can be checked that / e T
satisfied.
Choose any <p € $ such that <p £ ^P . We shall show that the hypothesis
of Property M is satisfied. Consider the function a : IT -» IT for all i er J ill
N defined by a (ti ) = {a) for all i e N and all ti € TT . Thus, a is a CCMO11 11
and for all 9 e 8,
a
(0) = a. Pick / € </> and g 6 F. Write /(a) as (x, y)
and g(a) as (x\ y'). By construction, the utility functions of agents 1
and 2 are state-independent. Therefore, given that they are completely
informed, the hypothesis of Property M is trivially satisfied for these two
agents. The following relationships imply that the hypothesis of Property
M is met for the remaining agents:
x + y fc x' + y' >* 0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x + y )] £ 0.5[0.25(x' +3333 33 33 3
y') + 0.75(x' + y')].
3 3 ^3
x + y > x' + y' => 0.5[0.75(x + y ) + 0.25(x + y )] > 0.5(0. 75(x' +4444 44 4^4 4
y') + 0.25(x' + y')].
4 44
For P to satisfy Property M, we must have f°Q e <p. foQ recommends the
following allocation in states b and c for agents 3 and 4:
b c
Agent 3 (x^ yj (x^ yj
Agent 4 (x
, y ) (x , y )
4 4 4 4
By interim individual rationality of /, (x
, y ) * (0, 0). By the
construction of this example and given that / e <p Q P , x > and x > 0.
3 4
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Choose c such that min{x , x ) > c > 0. Consider an alternative rule h € F
3 4
defined by
h(a) = /(a),
Vi e {1, 2}, V0 e (b, c), h(8) = /(a),
i l
h (b) = (x -e, y ),
3 3 3
h (b) = (x +e, y ),
4 4 4
h (c) = (x +-, y ),
3 3 3 3
h (c) = (x --, y ).
4 4 3 4
Thus, El/ (h <b, c}) = 0.5[0.25(x - e + y ) + 0.75(x + - + y )] =
3 ' 3 ^3 3 3 J 3
0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x + y )] = EU (/°9
a
|
<b, c». Trivially, for i
e {1, 2} and all e 8, EU (h
|
{6}) = EU {foQa
|
{en. Also, trivially,
for i € {3, 4}, El/ (h
|
{a}) = £(/ (/oGa | {a}). However, EU (h | {b, c» =
0.5[0.75(x + e + y ) + 0.25(x - - + y )] > 0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x +
4 •
/
4 434 4", 4 4
y )] = EU (/oG
a
I {b, c». Thus, /oea <i Pl .
4 4 '
For any <p S T with / € <p, we find that /<>0 g <p. Thus, tP violates
Property M. By Proposition 1, it is not Bayesian-implementable in e.
Theorem 2: If <p Q P , then <p is not Bayesian-implementable.
Proof: Consider the following example.
Example 3: Consider an economy e' which retains all the specifications of
e from Example 2 above with one exception: agent 3's utility function is
altered as follows:
u (z
,
9) =
3 3
(* + y ),
3 J 3
if 9 = a
(x + 1.5y ) if 9 = b
3 3
(x + 0.5y ) if 9 = c.
3 3
Given these specifications, T * 0. Choose a : 17 -> IT as in the previous
proof, i.e. for all i e N, for all n e TT , a (ir ) = {a). Thus, a is a111!
CCMO and for all 9 e 9, 9a(9) = a. Choose any <p € * such that <p Q T* and
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pick / € <p. Next, we establish that the hypothesis of Property M is met.
From the relationships derived in the proof of Theorem 1, we know that the
relevant relationships for agents 1, 2 and 4 hold. To check that the
relevant relationship holds for agent 3, consider the following
observations:
Pick / € <p and g <= F. Write /(a) as (x\ y), and g{a) as (x\ y').
Thus, we have
x + y > x' + y' => 0.5[(x: + 1.5y ) + (x + 0.5y )] £ 0.5[(x' +
3
J 3 3 J 3 3 3 3 ^
3
3
1.5y') + W + 0.5y')].
^3 3 3
Thus, the hypothesis of Property M is satisfied. For T to satisfy
oc oc
Property M, we must have f°0 e <p. f°B recommends the following
allocation in states a and b for agents 1 and 3:
Agent 1 (x
, yj (x^, y)
Agent 3 {x^ yj {x^, yj
By ex post individual rationality of /, (x
, y ) * (0, 0). By the
construction of this example and given that / e <p Q Te , x > and y > 0.
Choose c such that min{—x
, y } > e > 0. Consider an alternative rule h en 3 M
F defined by:
h (b) = (x +l.le, y -e)
l 11
h (b) = (x -1.1c, y +e)
3 3 J 3
Vi
€ {1, 3>, V9 € {a, c>, h (9) = /(a)
Vi
€ {2, 4}, h = / oea .
Thus, EC/ (h {b» = x - l.le + 1.5c + 1.5y = x + 0.4c + 1.5y > x +
3 ' 3 y 3 3 ^3 3
l.5y
3
= EI/ (/«ea | {b» and £1/ (h | {b» = x + l.le + l.ly - 1.1c = x +
l.ly = EU (/oea I <b>). For all i € N and all 9 e 6, /<>e
a
€ EL (h I {9}).li 1 i '
Thus, foQ <£ <p Q 7> e . Given that this holds for all <p Q Te , P e does not
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satisfy Property M. By Proposition 1, it is not Bayesian-implementable in
5. No Regret Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementability properties of
mechanisms with no regret and provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for this method of implementation.
A performance standard <p is No regret-implementable (NR-implementable
)
by rR in e = {L, N, e} if * E (D Q <p.
F
A performance standard <p is NR-implementable (in a global sense) if Ve
e &, 3T such that <p is NR-implementable by T in e.
p
Remark: <p is fully NR-implementable by V if £ (D = <p.
Next, we define some properties that shall be used to characterize
NR-implementable standards.
A performance standard cp satisfies Property Ml with respect to T ={N,
M, £} if the following is true:
3(p'
€ * such that <p' Q <p and V/ e F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / 6 <p'
(ii) Vi e N, Vg
€ F, V9 e 9, V9' = Q
a
(6), {Vs e E(D, g e EL(f
\
I°(0')) () EL(f
I
I(Q\ s))} =* {Vs' € S, go9a e EL(f°Qa \ I°(G)) f)
EUf°6a
J
I(Q, s'))},
then /o0 € <p\
A performance standard <p satisfies Property M2 with respect to T if V/
€
F, VCCMO's a, (i)' and (ii)' imply f°0 € <p, where (i)' / e <p and (ii)'
is the same as (ii) in the definition above.
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Theorem 3: Let e = {L, N, Q} be an economy in 8, and let <p be a performance
p
standard. If <p is NR-implementable by T in e, then <p satisfies Property
Ml with respect to T.
Proof: By definition of NR-implementation, for some game T = {N, M, *;},
there exists (p' Q <p such that cp' is fully NR-implemented by T . Thus, for
all / e <p' there exists s € E{T) that / = £>°s. By Condition (B) the
following holds for all i € N, for all 9 e 8, for all s' e S , for all s" <=
E(D:
^o(S', s ) € el (/ I i°(e)) n eu/
I
J(
.
s"» (i:
Choose a CCMO a. Next, suppose that for all i € N, for all 9 € 8, for all
9' = 9%), for all s" € £(D, for all g & EL(f \ I°(e')) fl EL (/ I
*
7 (9', s")), the following holds for all s € S:
go9a
€ el (foe*
| I°(e)) f) ELifoe" | i (e, s*); (2)
Given (1) and (2), for all i e N, for all 9 e 8, for all s' e S , for all
*
s e S, the following holds:
€•($;, s^jce" € ELCfoe* | i°(9)) H el (foe* \ lie, s*)) (3)
By definition of a, s »8 is IT -measurable for all i € N. By Condition
(A), (3) implies that s°9
a
€ E(D and /°9a € E (D. By definition of full
NR-implementation of <p\ E (D £ ^'. Thus, /°9 e <p' and <p satisfies
Property Ml.
Theorem 4: Let e = {L, N, Q} be an economy in 8 and let <p be a performance
standard. There exists T such that if <p satisfies Property M2 with respect
to T, then <p is NR-implementable by V in e.
Proof: The proof of this statement derives from the following lemmata.
Lemma 1: There exist T and s € E(T) such that for all i € N, for all 9 € 8,
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/ (q, s) = {e}.
i
Lemma 2: There exists T such that (i) T satisfies Lemma 1 and (ii) if <p
satisfies Property M2 with respect to T, then E (V) Q tp.
The proofs of these results are given in the appendix.
Corollary to Theorem 4: Let e = {L, N, &} be an economy in 6, and let <p be
a performance standard. If <p is fully NR-implementable by T in e, then <p
satisfies Property M2 with respect to T. Conversely, there exists T such
that if <p satisfies Property M2 with respect to T, then <p is fully
NR-implementable by T in e.
6. No Regret Implementation and Welfare Implications
This section explores whether or not the individual
rationality-efficiency performance standards are implementable by no regret
mechanisms. We have bad news and good news. The bad news is that the
interim standard is not NR-implementable. The good news is that the ex
post standard is. Often we are not interested in implementing the entire
ex post individual rationality-efficiency set. Instead, we would like to
find out which subsets of this set are implementable. This brings us to
the most significant result: any performance standard that is
Nash-implementable is NR-implementable. Hence, extremely important
economic performance standards such as the core or the Walrasian
correspondence are implementable by mechanisms with no regret even in
asymmetric information economies.
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Theorem 5: "P is not NR-implementable.
Proof: Suppose that the theorem were not true, i.e. for all e € 8, there
1 R
exists a game T such that T is NR-implementable by T in e. Consider the
economy e defined in Example 2 (see proof of Theorem 1 above). By
definition of NR-implementation, for some V = {N, M, £,) in e, there exists
<p Q T such that for all f € <p, there exists s 6 E(D with ^s = /. In
addition, check that in the economy e in Example 2, the hypotheses of
Property Ml are satisfied with respect to T. Choose a CCMO a as in Example
2. Pick f € (p and g € F. Write /(a) as (x, y) and g(a) as (x\ y'). By
construction, the utility functions of agents 1 and 2 are
state-independent. Therefore, given that they are completely informed, the
hypothesis of Property Ml is trivially satisfied for these two agents. The
following relationships imply that the hypothesis of Property Ml is met for
the remaining agents:
x + y £ x' + y' => 0.5[0.25(x + y ) + 0.75(x + y )] > 0.5[0.25(x' +3333 33 33 3
y') + 0.75(x' + y')].
3 3 3
x + y > x' + y' =» 0.5[0.75(x + y ) + 0.25(x + y )] > 0.5[0.75(x' +4444 4"/ 4 4 4 4
y') + 0.25(x' + y')] and
4 44
x + y > x' + y' =* 0.25(x + y ) £ 0.25(x' + y')
3 3 3 y 3 3 J 3 3 J 3
x + y > x' + y' => 0.75(x + y ) £ 0.75(x' + y')
3 ^3 3 y 3 3 3 3 "^3
x + y > x' + y' => 0.75(x + y ) > 0.75(x' + y')
4 4 4
y
4 4 4 4
J
4
x + y >: x' + y' =» 0.25(x + y ) £ 0.25(x' + y')
4 4 4^4 4"'4 4", 4
Given these observations, the hypothesis of Property Ml is met for any
game T. The rest of the proof of Theorem 5 follows the proof of Theorem 1
and it is established that f°B 4 <p. Thus, T does not satisfy Property Ml
with respect to r. Given Theorem 3 and the assumption that *P is
NR-implementable by T
,
we have a contradiction.
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Theorem 6: T is NR-implementable.
This result follows from Lemma 3 and a more general result given in
Theorem 7. The lemma is proved in the appendix. We shall use the
following definition:
A performance standard <p satisfies Property M if the following is
true:
3<p'e $ such that <p' £ <p and V/ e F, VCCMO's a,
if (i) / € <p' and
(ii) vi € n, v g € f, ve € e, ve' = e
a
(e), (g e EL(f | {e'>;; =>
{go9a e ELffoQ* | <e>;>,
then f°Q e <p .
e *Lemma 3: T satisfies Property M .
Theorem 7: Let <p be a performance standard. If <p is Bayesian-implementable
(Nash-implementable) in economies with complete information (i.e. for all i
€ N and all 6 e 9, I (6) = {6}), then <p is NR-implementable.
Proof: By Proposition 1, if <p is Bayesian-implementable in economies with
complete information, it must satisfy Property M . By definition, if <p
*
satisfies Property M , then there exists <p' Q <p which satisfies Property M2
with respect to any game T such that for all i € N and all € 6, there
exists s e £(D with I (6, s) = {Q}. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and the
Corollary to Theorem 4, <p' is fully NR-implementable. Thus, <p is
NR-implementable.
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7. Extensions
In many economic problems of interest, initial endowments are not
specified (for example, when resources are owned collectively) or a social
planner may wish to efficiently allocate resources in an "equitable"
manner. In such situations, we may want to replace the individual
rationality condition with some equity requirement, such as freedom from
envy (Foley (1967). The results reported in this paper, both and positive
ones, hold for the corresponding problem of implementing the interim and ex
post envy-free-efficient performance standards.
To summarize, we have shown that it is impossible to design
"interesting" efficient mechanisms under asymmetric information using
Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. Yet under complete
information such mechanisms are possible. By employing mechanisms with no
regret, similar to ones introduced by Green and Laffont (1987), we have a
solution to the problem. Such mechanisms provide channels for endogenous
leakage of information. In general, any success that has been achieved by
Nash-implementation theory for complete information economies can be
mimicked in situations where information is non-exclusive and incomplete.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we shall prove the lemmata presented in the main
body of the paper. For this purpose, we shall devise an algorithm which
generates a game for every performance standard. Let §" denote the
algorithm and let S*(<p) denote the game that is generated when a particular
<p is applied to the algorithm given below. For all <p € $, ^§{<p) - iN, M, £}
is defined as follows:
(I) Vi € N, M = <m = (n (i), f(i), S(i)) € II x F X R
+
>.
Definition: Vi <= N, m satisfies Property y\i if the following conditions
hold:
(i) H tt (j) * 0.
1 I j€N\(i> j J
(ii) 3/ e ? such that Vj e JV\{i>, /(j) = /.
(iii) Vj e W\U>, 5(j) = 0.
* *
Definition: Vm € M, 9 (m) is defined such that f\ n (i) = {8 (m)}.
1
' 1€N i
Definition: Vi 6 N, Vm € M , (m ) is defined such that tt ( j)
-1 -1 1 -1 ' ' j€N\(i> j J
= {9(m )>.
l -l
Definition: Vm € M, Kim) = ii e W: Vj € JVMO, 5(i) 2: 6{j)>.
(II) £: M -> A is given by the schematic diagram in Figure 3.
At
Proof of Lemma h_ Choose / e <p. We shall show that there exists s e
E{£(<p)) such that £o S = / and for all i e JV and all 8 € 9, I (9, s) = ie).
Construct a strategy list s e S as follows: for all i <= N, for all 9 € 9,
s(e) = (JO), /, 0). It may be checked that for all i e A/, for all €
i l
0, s (9) satisfies Property y|£. By construction, Case 1 applies and ^»s
= /•
Consider a unilateral deviation to s' e S by agent i. We write s' =
l i i
(s* , s' , s' ). Note that by assumption A2, for all 9 € 9, 9 (s (9)) =
11 12 13
J 1-1
9. For all 9 € 0, there are two possibilities:
(a) s' (9) = /, in which case either Case 1 or Case 2 applies and
12
€(s'(e), s (9)) e </(e), oh^i-i
(b) s' (9) * /. Case 3 applies and e,{s'{d), s (9)) e </'(i)(e), 0}.
12 i -1
By strict monotonicity of preferences, u (/, 9) ^ u (0, 9) for all 9 € 9.
By construction for all j e N, s (9) = I (9). In conjunction with
assumption A2, this implies that for all 9 e 9, for all 9' € J°(8)M9),
there exists j € N\{i) such that s {6) * s (9'). Thus, for all i € N,
ji ji
for all 9 e 9, J (9, s) = {9>. If possibility (b) occurs, by Case 3, we
have £©(s\ s ) € ELif {9}) which implies that for all s" € S, %°{s\
s) € EL(/ | I°(9)) f) ELC/ | 7(9, s")). By Condition (A), s e
E(^(<p)). Given ^«s = / € (p, we have £($*(<p)) * 0.
Proof of Lemma 2i By Lemma 1, EV§{(p)) * 0. We need to show that E (&(v>))
c <p.
Step L_ The proof of this lemma makes use of the following result:
Lemma 2.1: Let s € E(&(<p)). For all 9 € 9, s(6) satisfies Case 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: We shall establish that there cannot be a state 9 e 9
Ku
such that s(0) = in (i), f(i), Sii)) satisfies either of the cases 2, 3
1 1€N
or 4. We write s as (s , s , s ) where the components of this list
1 il 12 13
denote the functions induced by restricting the range of s to II , F and IR
respectively.
Suppose that for some 9 € 0, s(0) satisfies one of the following: Case
2, Case 3 or Case 4. A contradiction will be established. Consider a
unilateral deviation by agent i e N to s' e S such that s' = is , s
,11 1 11 12
s' ). s" is such that for all J € WY(i>, for all 0' e 6, s. (0') <
13 13 J3
s' (6'). Let m = s(e) and m* = (s'(0), s (e)). We shall show that
13 1-1
there exists i € N such that the following hold:
€
(m') > ^(m) (*)
V8' 6 8, ^(sjO*), s (9*)) ^ ^(s(9*)) (**)
There are two possibilities:
(i) Possibility 1: There exists j e N such that K{m) = {j}.
Therefore, for all i € N\{j), m does not satisfy Property y\i. Choose i
€ N\{j}. By definition, Property y|£ is not met even if i deviates to s'_.
By the outcome rule associated with Case 4A, we have £, (m') = Q. Since
|AT\{j}| > 1, there exists i € N\{j} such that £ (m) * Q. Thus, (*) holds.
(ii) Possibility 2: There does not exist any J 6 N such that Kim) =
{j}. In this case, by construction, £(m) = 0. By the outcome rules
associated with Cases 2A, 3A and 4A, and given that for all 0' e 8, for all
/ € <p, fie') * 0, there exists i 6 N such that £im') > 0. Thus, (*)
holds.
To check that (**) is true for the agent i for whom (*) holds, choose
0" e 8 with 0" * 0. There are, again, two possibilities:
(a) Possibility 1: There exists j e N such that Kisie")) = (J}. The
arguments given in (i) above apply. Thus, for all k e N\{j), £ is'ie"),
k k
Kb
s (9")) = fl. Also, £(s'(9"), s (9")) = C(s(8")). Thus, (**) holds for
-k J -J
i.
(b) Possibility 2: There does not exist j € N such that K(s(9")) =
{j}. By construction, for some / € <p, £,(s(9")) € {/, OK By the outcome
rules associated with Cases 2A, 3A and 4A, we conclude that £(s'(9"),
s (9")) 6 {/. Q). Thus, (*•) holds for i.
Given that (*) and (**) are true, and given strict monotonicity of
preferences, we conclude that if s(0) does not satisfy Case 1, for some 9 e
8, then s 4. EC§(<p)). This contradicts the assumption that s € £(&(</?)).
Step 2i Choose s <= E(£(<p)). By Lemma 2.1, for all 9 € 9, s(Q) must
satisfy Case 1. We write s as (s , s , s ). Thus, for all 9 € 0,
'
l 11 12 13
*Os (9) * and 9 (s(9)) is well-defined. By IT -measurability of s,1€N 11 1 i
(s ) defines a CCMO and we shall write it as a, where for all i 6 N,
11 1€N
*
for all 9 € 9, a (1(e)) = s (9). Observe that for all 9 € 9, 9 (s(9)) =
i i u
ct
*
9 (9). By construction, for all 9 € 9, there exists / e <p such that
*
s (9) = / . This implies that there exists f e <p such that for all 9 € 9,
£(s(9)) = /(9 (s(9)), i.e. £<> s = /"°ea . We need to show that /°9a € <p.
We shall first show that for all i e W, for all 9 € 9, for all 9" =
9
a
(9), if g e EL if | 1(9', s )) for all s* € E(£(?)), then g°9
a
e
EL (/°9a | I°(e)) () EL (/o9
a
| I (9, s)) for all s € S. In the case where
f = g, this is trivially true. To show that this is true even when f * g,
choose i e N and g e F such that g * f and for all 9 € 9 and for all 9' =
9
a
(9), for all s € EVSdp)), g € EL(f \ 7(9', s )). By Lemma 1, there
exists s € E(£(<p)) such that for all 9
€ 9, I (9, s ) = {9}. Thus, g e
ELY/ | 7(9', s )) for all s € E(£(p)) implies that g e EL (/ | <9*>).
Suppose i unilaterally deviates to s' e S where for all 9 6 9, s'(9) =
M
(s (9), g, 5'U)). S'U) is such that for all J € N\{i), for all 9 e 0,
5'(i) > s (0). By construction, for all 9 € 9, 6 (s (9)) = 9 (s(9)).
J3 1-1
Thus, for all 9 € 0, (s'(9), s (9)) satisfies Case 3A and £((s'(9),
i -l i
* a
s (9)) = g(6 (s (9))) = g(Q (s(9)) = g(9 (9)). Observe that, by
-l ° i -l
*
Condition (B), s € £(S*(<p)) implies that for all 9 e Q, for all s e
EVS{<p)), g°e
a
€ EL{foQa
|
i°{q)) f) £U/°9
a
| I (G, s*)). By Lemma 1,
there exists s € £(§"(<?)) such that 7 (9, s ) = {9} for all 9 e 0. Thus,
g°e
a
g £L (/" <>9a | {9}) for all 9 € 8 and we conclude that for all s e S,
goea e EHfoe" | r°(e)) fl EUf°e
a
|
r(e, s)).
Given that the last conclusion holds for all i 6 W, by the fact that <p
satisfies Property M2 with respect to §"(<?), we have /°9 e <p.
Proof of Lemma 3: Choose / e T and a CCMO a. Suppose that for all i e A/,
for all 9 6 0, for all 9' = 9
a
(9), if /' € EL (f \ O')), then /'°g
a
e
EUf°ea | {9».
Next, suppose that / <>9 g <p . We shall prove that this yields a
contradiction. f°Q 4 T implies either one or both of the following
possibilities:
Possibility A: f°6 is not individually rational, i.e. given w € F defined
by w(9) = w for all 9 € 0, there exists j € N and 9 € such that w £
EL(f°ea | <e».
Possibility B: f°G is not ex post efficient, i.e. there exists g, h 6 F
OL OL *
*
such that h = g°e with h & EL (/°9 I <9 }) for some k e N and some 9 e
k '
a
and /o9
€ EL (h {9'» for all i e W and all 9' e 0.
By assumption, for all i 6 Af, for all 9 e 0, for all 9" = 9 (9), for
all /'
€ F if /* € EL(f
|
{9"}), then /'o9a e EL(f°ea
|
<6». This
implies that for w, g, 9, 9 J and k given above, Possibility A implies ( + )
kS
and Possibility B implies (++) and (+++), where
w t el if | {e">) for e" = e
a
(e) (+)
g * EL (f I <e"» for e" = e
a
(e ) (++)
k '
and for all i € N, for all 9' e 6,
/ € ELig
|
{e'» (+++)
( + ) contradicts the fact that / € T implies ex post individual rationality
of /. (++) and (+++) contradict the fact that / € T implies ex post
efficiency of /. Thus Possibilities A and B cannot occur and we conclude
that /°ea € Pe . m
)
h(o
Rain
L M R
Shine
M R
T 10, 10 10, 5 0,
B 5, 5 5, 10 0,
T 10, 10 5, 5 10,
B 5, 5 20, 1C 0,
Clouds
M R
T 5, 10 5, 10 10,
B 10, 10 5, 5 5, 10
Figure 1
s (Rain) =
1
T;
s (Shine) =
1
' T;
s (Clouds)
1
= T;
s'(Rain) =
l
T:
s' (Shine) =
l
T;
s' (Clouds)
l
= 7";
s"(Rain) =
i
B;
s"(Shine) =
i
B;
s"(Clouds)
i
= B;
•
s (Rain) =
l
B;
*
s (Shine) =-- B;
s (Rain) = L
2
s (Shine) = L
2
s (Clouds) = L
2
s'(Rain) = L
2
s' (Shine) = L
2
s' (Clouds) = M
2
s"(Rain) = M
2
s"( Shine) = M
2
s"(Clouds) = R
2
s (Rain) = M
2
*
s (Shine) = M
2
s (Clouds) = B; s (Clouds) = L
2
Figure 2
F2.
Let m = (n (i), f(i) 5(i))
I 1€N
Case 1:
*
Vi 6 W, (i) 39 € 6 such that 9 (m) = <9>, (ii) 3/ € <p such that /(i) = f,
and (iii) 5(i) = 0.
£(m) = /(9)
Case 2:
(i) 3/ € <p such that Vj € N, f{j) = /, (ii) 3i 6 JV such that m . satisfies
-i
Property y\i and (iii) the conditions of Case 1 are not all met.
Case 2A
Kim) = ii)
£(m) = /(e (m ))1-1
Case 2B
Otherwise
£(m) =
Figure 3
F!>
Case 3:
31 € N such that (i) Vj e N\{i}, f(i) * f(j) and (ii) m_ satisfies
Property y I i.
Case 3A
(i) Kim) = {i}
(ii) /(i) € EL(/(J)| {9(m )}), j * L
€(m) = /(i)(9(m ))
1 -i
Case 3B
Otherwise
1
€(m) =
Case 4:
Otherwise
Case 4A:
3i
€ N with K(m) = <i}
Case 4B
Otherwise
(€ (m). C (m)) = (£2, 0)
i -i
€(m) =
Figure 3 (Contd.)
F4-

}\
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